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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State of Ardenia filed this case against the State of Rigalia before
the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 36(2) of the Statute of
the Court on May 5, 2010. Both countries are party to the Court's
Compulsory jurisdiction, and the parties have submitted a Compromis in
order to stipulate the agreed facts of the dispute pursuant to Article 40(1) of
the Court's Statute. In preliminary proceedings, Rigalia objected to the
Court's jurisdiction on the grounds that Morgania was a necessary third
party, under Article 79 of the Rules of Court. By a ruling of 8-7, the Court
denied that Morgania was a necessary party, and allowed this case to
proceed to the merits phase.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The State of Ardenia respectfully asks this Honorable Court:
1. Whether Rigalia's Predator drone strikes in Rigalia and Ardenia
violated international law.
2. Whether the attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital violated
international law, specifically:
a. whether the act is attributable to Rigalia;
b. whether the act was an unlawful use of force rising to the
level of aggression; and
c. whether Rigalia has an obligation to investigate the attack
and compensate Ardenia for the harm caused by the attack.
3. Whether Rigalia's Mavazi ban constitutes a violation of
international human rights law.
4. Whether Ardenia violated the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
and/or the OECD Decision on MNE Guidelines when it refused




The Zetian Provinces and the Zetian Democratic Party
The dispute before this Court centers on conflicts arising in the Zetian
Provinces of the states of Ardenia (Applicant) and Rigalia (Respondent)
and the related economic, political, and military actions of Rigalia. The two
states share a population of ethnic Zetians - a nomadic people who move
between Ardenia's Southern and Rigalia's Northern Provinces (Comp.
T 10). These Provinces are the location of major deposits of Coltan; mining
the economically important mineral is the region's major industry.
Ardenia, a decentralized state, permits its ten provinces to control their
own legislative policies in most matters (Comp. 6). Ardenia's Southern
Regions are inhabited by ethnic Zetians, a devout people who practice the
Masinto religion and govern themselves through tribal law, which exercises
dominion over most areas of their society (Comp. 3). Traditionally,
Masinto women wear the Mavazi, a head covering that symbolizes their
orthodoxy, in all aspects of public life (Comp. 3). The central Ardenian
authority limits its interference with such religious customs and practices.
The Zetians have been granted dual citizenship by both states (Comp.
8). Due to the Rigalian government's anti-Zetian policies, a group known
as the Zetian Democratic Party ("ZDP") has been gaining in popularity and
now represents more than 75% of Zetians in the Northern Provinces (Comp.
9). At the May 5, 2008 Regional Joint Tribal Council Meeting, Zetian
leaders of Rigalia's Northern Provinces issued a manifesto calling for
increased autonomy for Zetian lands, with the ultimate goals of
independence, a larger portion of the coltan mining revenue, and respect for
their traditional way of life (Comp. 13). Rigalia's President, Teemu
Khutai, responded through a nationally televised speech, peppered with
ethnically-charged invectives against Zetians, referring to their societal
practices as barbaric, oppressive, and backwards (Comp. 14).
The Mavazi Ban
Rigalia and Ardenia took different approaches to addressing these
tensions. Angered, President Khutai, invoked the Rigalian emergency
powers clause, banned organized assembly in public places, and ordered the
detention of suspected ZDP members (Comp. 16). Ardenian President,
Glenda Arwen, stating that she respected Zetian piety, responded to the
protests by dedicating substantial funds to Zetian schools and agricultural
subsidies to Zetian farmers (Comp. 17).
ZDP members called for full independence (Comp. 18). In the period
from December 2008 to February 2009, violence escalated, resulting in
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more than 250 casualties (Comp. 18). One of the suicide bombers donned
a Mavazi as a disguise (Comp. 18). In reaction, Rigalia passed legislation
that restricted the Zetians' religious rights by banning the wearing of the
sacred garment in public places, effectively banning it completely (Comp.
10,21).
The Predator Drone Program
Responding to Rigalian oppression, Zetians began to cross the border
into Ardenia (Comp. 19). In an effort to mitigate violence and promote
peace, President Arwen met with Zetian tribal leaders in January, 2009
(Comp. 20). She assured them that their customs would be respected and
that Ardenia supported Zetian unification in Rigalia (Comp. 120). In
consideration of her gesture, the Zetian leaders offered their assurance that
Ardenian sovereignty would be respected and Ardenian civilians and
government would not be harmed (Comp. 20).
Angered by President Arwen's efforts at peace, President Khutai
announced on March 22, 2009 that Ardenia was at war with the Zetian
secessionist movement and its supporters, whether found in Ardenia or
Rigalia (Comp. 121). He requested military assistance from President
Sophia Ratko of the technologically sophisticated, industrialized state of
Morgania through the use of its Predator drone technology (Comp. 27,
28). With security and economic interests in mind, President Ratko agreed
to deploy Morganian Predator drones on behalf of Rigalia for purposes of
combating Zetian terrorists (Comp. 27).
The unmanned Predator drones, armed with Hellfire missiles, are
launched from Fort Raucus, a Rigalian Air Force base leased by Morgania.
The drones are operated by the Morganian army in Morgania (Comp. 29).
The Morganian operators receive targeting information from Rigalian
prisoners, recruited and paid by the Rigalian government as informants
(Comp. 29). At the urging of the Rigalian Defense Force, controlled by
President Khutai, more than 50 strikes were carried out against suspected
Zetian separatists, killing an estimated 230 civilians in Rigalia, but only 15
suspected Zetian separatist leaders (Comp. 129).
On March 15, 2010, Morgania launched a Predator drone strike in
Ardenia (Comp. 30). The attack was directed against a single ZDP
Leaders, Adar Bermal. The attack killed ZDP Bermal, but also struck the
Bakchar Valley Hospital, a 300-bed public hospital, next door killing 150
civilians, and maiming 200 more (Comp. 30). Ardenia immediately lodged
a protest with Rigalia for targeting innocent civilians (Comp. 31).
Rigalia's defense minister responded that the incident was "a regrettable




The economic relations between Ardenia and Rigalia center around the
Coltan mining in Rigalia, run by the state-owned Rigalian Refining Inc.
("RRI"), which is headed by CEO Leo Bikra (Comp. 10). However, recent
developments surrounding the exploration and development of the Moria
Mine, situated in the Rigalian Northern Provinces, under a contract with the
Ardenian state-owned corporation, Mineral Dynamics Incorporated
("MDI"), has strained this relationship.
MDI is active in its community and voluntarily publishes information
regarding its donations on its website, the forum in which it revealed that it
donated funds to the Zetian Refugee Fund ("ZRF"), a charitable
organization whose goals are to supply education and humanitarian
assistance to ethnic Zetians (Comp. 11). This charity is headed by Clyde
Zangara, Leo Bikra's nephew (Comp. 11).
The Moria Mine contract was renewed in 2002 (Comp. 112). A media
report stated that the deal had been partially secured through a promise by
MDI to pay $10 million dollars into a trust account for the ZRF charity
(Comp. T12). Rigalia believes that such funds may be used for political
activities, and there is speculation about tribal council members soliciting
promises of payment from MDI (Comp. 12).
President Khutai pushed the Ardenian government to ignore its
business records protection laws and proceed with an investigation into
these allegations (Comp. 22). Khutai then called for his Minister of
Justice, Charlene Finch, to open an investigation, suspended Leo Bikra, and
requested that the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International
Business Transactions put pressure on the Ardenian government (Comp.
22, 24). This led the Committee for Responsible Business Conduct
("CRBC"), an organization that received 30%. of its operating budget from
the Rigalian government, to file a complaint with the OECD Council
(Comp. 26). The Ardenian National Contact Point responded that it was
unable to examine the complaint because the alleged actions occurred in
Rigalia, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises do not apply to
Rigalian Refining Inc., and investigations had already been launched in
both states (Comp. 26).
Ardenia subsequently filed a protest with Rigalia regarding the drone
strikes, and referred the accidental missile strike to the U.N. Security
Council, which advised the parties to seek a peaceful resolution for this
matter. Meanwhile, claims brought by Zetians within the Rigalia courts,
contesting the legality of the drone strikes and the Mavazi ban, were
dismissed and not subject to appeal (Clarification #5). Thereafter, Ardenia
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I. Violence in Rigalia did not rise to the level of an armed conflict
because the Zetian secessionist movement did not possess sufficient
organizational capacity to constitute an armed group, nor did the tensions
rise to the requisite threshold. As such, the conflict is governed by
international human rights law. Rigalia's Predator drone strikes, which
killed 230 Zetian civilians in Rigalia and killed and wounded 350 in
Ardenia, violated human rights law enshrined in Article 6(1) of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which
guarantees that every human has an inherent right to life, and states may not
arbitrarily deprive persons of this right to life. This right is non-derogable
even in times of public emergency or threats to national existence. Even if
the conflict did rise to the level necessary to amount to an armed conflict,
Rigalia violated the lex specialis of international humanitarian law by
failing to distinguish between innocent civilians and legitimate military
targets in carrying out its Predator drone strikes. Moreover, since the
number of innocent civilians killed was twenty-five times the number of
targeted Zetian leaders, the strikes violated the international principles of
necessity and proportionality, and the prohibition on causing superfluous
harm.
II. Though the Predator drone strikes were operated by Morgania, Rigalia
is responsible for the bombing of the Bakchar Valley hospital in Ardenia
and is obligated to make reparations for the damages under international
law. Rigalia requested the strike, allowed its territory to be used to carry out
the strike, and Rigalian informants played an integral part in the operation.
Moreover, by making official statements to justify rather than condemning
the illegal act, Rigalia endorsed the action and should be held responsible
for the harm suffered. Rigalia's attack on the Bakchar valley hospital was
an unjustified act of aggression. Rigalia cannot claim that destruction of this
hospital was justified by self-defense, because the requisite elements of
necessity and proportionality were not present. Furthermore, Rigalia is
foreclosed from asserting self-defense because it did not make the required
notification to the Security Council immediately following the attack
pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
III. The freedoms of religion, thought and expression are fundamental
principles of international human rights enshrined in the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Rigalia's Mavazi ban violates these internationally protected rights of
Zetian women and girls by usurping their autonomy to participate in their
religion and denying their ability to outwardly manifest their faith and
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culture. Moreover, the ban is illegitimate as it is not narrowly construed or
tailored to a particular goal, nor does the aim of the ban fit into the
exception for maintaining public order.
IV. Rigalia's counterclaim that Ardenia has violated the OECD
Convention is without merit. The case does not come within the ambit of
the OECD convention or guidelines because the targets of the alleged
bribery were not "foreign officials." Ardenia, therefore, had no obligation
to investigate the alleged acts of bribery; nevertheless, it launched an
investigation into the CRBC's claims. When Ardenia faced national
security concerns tied to the investigation and the heightened tensions
arising from the Rigalian-Zetian hostilities, the state was forced to drop the
investigation. Even if the case came within the OECD Convention, this
would have been a permissible action, as the Convention creates an
exception for national security concerns. While the OECD does not allow
for an exception on national economic interest grounds, the fact remains
that overwhelming state practice takes this element into account. Finally,
the small facilitation payments made by MDI are not a violation of the




I. THE PREDATOR DRONE STRIKES TARGETING ZETIANS IN RIGALIA
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.
A. The tensions between Rigalia and the ZDP did not rise to the level of an
armed conflict and therefore human rights law governs the use ofPredator
drones.
International humanitarian law ("IHL") only applies to armed
conflicts.' At all other times, only the lex generalis of international human
rights law ("HRL") applies. In the present case, tensions between the ZDP
and Rigalia did not rise to the level necessary to constitute an armed
conflict and thus international human rights law is the applicable standard.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol II set forth general criteria to use in determining the existence of
an armed conflict. 2 Drawing from these criteria, international jurisprudence
focuses on two key elements: (1) the organization of the parties to a
conflict; and (2) the intensity of the conflict.
1. The Zetian separatists do not possesses sufficient organizational capacity
to constitute a party to an armed conflict.
A group must possess sufficient organizational capacity in order to be
a party to an armed conflict.4 Drawing upon the framework of the Geneva
Conventions, courts have focused on the following incidia of organizational
capacity: existence of headquarters; designated zones of operation; the
1. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(Advisory Opinion), 2004 I.C.J. 136, 95,105 (July 9) [hereinafter Palestinian Wall].
2. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflict, art. 1(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]; See also
COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS
IN TIME OF WAR, CONVENTION IV 49-50 (Jean Pictet, ed.)(1958)(describing the scope of
application for Common Article 3).
3. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17 1998, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 9 [hereinafter ICC Statute]; Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70
(Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tadic Defense];
4. GC III, supra note 2, at art. 4(2); ICC Statute, supra note 3, at art. 8(2)(f);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Judgment) 1618-621 (Sept. 2, 1998)
[hereinafter Akayesu].
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ability to procure, transport and distribute arms;' a demonstrable hierarchy;'
and capacity to coordinate its actions.7
There is no evidence to suggest that the Zetian -separatists possess the
requisite organizational elements. Rigalia cannot impute the pre-existing
structure of the ZDP and the Zetian social hierarchy to the amorphous rebel
group that Rigalia claims to be fighting. President Khutai has not specified
with who Rigalia is at war; rather he simply claimed to wage war against an
amorphous collection of individuals which he described as the "Zetian
secessionist movement and its supporters." As demonstrated by the facts
and by Khutai's statements, the Zetian secessionist movement and the ZDP
are separate entities.9
The societal organization of Zetians and the structure of the ZDP
cannot be used in an attempt to show that the Zetian secessionists possess
sufficient organizational capacity to be a party to an armed conflict. As
noted in the Goldstone Report, a state cannot simply attribute one
organization's structure or militant qualities to another simply because both
share the same nationality, race, or location.'o
2. The tensions between Zetians and Rigalia do not meet the intensity
threshold necessary to constitute an armed conflict
In order to constitute an armed conflict, fighting between armed
groups must exceed the intensity of mere "internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic attacks of violence or other
acts of a similar nature."" International tribunals have considered factors
including seriousness of attacks, increase of attacks over time, and an
increase in mobilization and distribution of weapons among both parties. 12
5. Prosecutor v. Fatmir Lima], Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, 190 (Nov. 30,
2005) [hereinafter Limaj].
6. Id. at 1110.
7. Id. at 1108.
8. Compromis 121 [hereinafter Comp.].
9. Comp. 19,21.
10. Human Rts. Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab
Territories, 134, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sep. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report].
11. Protocol II, supra note 2, at art. 1(2); see also ICC Statute, supra note 3, at art.
(8)(2)(f).
12. Limaj, supra note 5, at 190. See also Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarculovski, Case
No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, 177-78,193 (July 10, 2008), Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-
94-1-A, Judgment, 566 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Judgment].
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Additionally, most courts have held that tensions must exist for a prolonged
period of time before hostilities can be classified as an armed conflict.' 3
The facts of this case do not indicate a demonstrable pattern of
increased or even sustained attacks, either geographically or temporally. In
fact, the Zetian attacks only spanned a three-month period. 14 As such, the
present conflict resembles a short-lived internal disturbance that does not
meet the intensity threshold required by Common Article 3.
B. Rigalia's Predator drone strikes within its territory violate applicable
human rights law.
Rigalia's use of Predator drones must comport with human rights law,
because it is not engaged in an armed conflict with the ZDP.15 As such,
Rigalia is obligated to abide by the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which expressly guarantees every human
being's inherent right to life, and forbids the arbitrary deprivation of human
life.' 6 These rights are non-derogable even in times of public emergency or
national security.' 7
Rigalian attacks both in Rigalia and Ardenia killed hundreds of
innocent Zetian Ardenians,' 8 arbitrarily depriving them of their lives, in
direct violation of the ICCPR and customary international law.' 9 Rigalia
may attempt to claim that the ICCPR does not apply to acts outside of its
territory. However, this contention must be rejected as this Court has
13. Tadic Defense, supra note 3, at 170; See also ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2);
Akayesu,
supra note 4, at 11618-621.
14. Comp. 18.
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
16. Id. at art. 6(1) (declaring "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.").
17. Id. at art 4(l).
18. Comp. 129-30.
19. Palestinian Wall, supra note 1, 18. See also Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50,
12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 51,
12 Aug. 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85[hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 147, 12 Aug, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S.
287[hereinafter GC IV]; GC III, supra note 2, at art. 130.
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established that the ICCPR applies "in respect of acts done by a state in the
exercise of its jurisdiction outside of its own territory."20
C. Even ifthe tensions amounted to an armed conflict, Rigalia violated its
international obligations under international humanitarian law.
Rigalian drone strikes violated applicable lex specialis of non-
international armed conflicts enshrined in Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, as well as customary
international law.2 ' Under IHL, Rigalia's Predator drone strikes must
comply with four elements: (1) the attack must distinguish between civilian
and military targets; (2) the attack must be necessary; (3) the attack must be
proportional; and, (4) the attack must not cause superfluous harm.
1. Rigalia failed to abide by the principle of distinction.
Parties to an armed conflict must distinguish between civilians and
combatants.22 Therefore, even if the Zetian secessionist movement were an
armed party to a conflict, Rigalia has an obligation to make distinctions
between civilians and legitimate military targets. Rigalia failed to determine
whether the targets of its Predator drone strikes were members of an
organized group participating in hostilities or whether they were innocent
civilians.23 Instead, Rigalia indiscriminately carried out attacks against
"supporters" of the Zetian movement,24 be they civilian or otherwise, in
clear violation of international law and the principle of distinction.
20. Palestinian Wall, supra note 1, at 111; See also Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226,125 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Goldstone Report, supra note 10, at 298.
21. Protocol II, supra note 2. See also GC IH, supra note 2; Declaration on the Rules
of International Humanitarian Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Taormina Declaration), Apr. 7, 1990, 30 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 383-
403.
22. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]; See also Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note
20, at 178(declaring that the principle of distinction is one of the "cardinal principles contained
in the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law."); Protocol on Prohibitions on the Use
of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 art. 3(7), 3 May, 1996,
2048 U.N.T.S 93 (1996).
23. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Interpretive Guidance on Direct Participation
in Hostilities, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 991 (Dec. 2008); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. against




2. Rigalian Predator drone strikes against Zetians were not necessary and
proportional
Under the principal of military necessity, states may use force only to
the extent necessary, and are prohibited from destruction of property and
life unless "imperatively demanded by the necessities of war," 2 5 for which
there is no equivalent alternative.26 Rigalia's Predator drone program was a
manifest violation of this principle, as the circumstances did not necessitate
the use of such force. Rigalia made no attempt to utilize less destructive
means of force to suppress Zetian attacks, and instead chose to wage a
lethal campaign to achieve ends that could likely have been attained
through the non-lethal means that Ardenia implemented on its side of the
border.
The use of force must also be proportional with respect to the expected
military advantage.2 7 IJIL prohibits launching attacks "which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." 28
Rigalia's Predator drone strikes, which killed or injured 230 civilians in
Rigalia and 350 in Ardenia, caused disproportionate harm in relation to the
military advantage to be attained, violating the customary international law
principle of proportionality.
3. Rigalian Predator drone strikes caused superfluous harm.
It is a principle of customary international law, recognized by this
court in the Nuclear Weapons Case, that a state does not have unfettered
freedom in its choice of weapons and may not use weapons that cause
25. The Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(g), 18
October 1907, 1 Bevans 577, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4374cae64.html. See also ICC Statute, supra note 3, at
art. 8(2)(b)iv); GC IV, supra note 19, at art. 53.
26. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of an Armed Conflict art 6(1), March 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S 172 (1999).
27. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392, 1l76,194 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; See also Nuclear Weapons
Advisory Opinion, supra note 20, at 1130,41,.
28. Protocol I, supra note 22, at art. 51(5)(b). See also Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, supra note 27, at art.
3(3)(c); ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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disproportionate injury or unnecessary suffering. 29 As this Court stated,
"[s]tates must never. . . use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing
between civilian and military targets." 30
Though there is no quantified threshold for what constitutes
superfluous harm, the dispositive element is that Rigalia continued to use
Predator drones over a prolonged period, despite the fact that the weapons
were causing excessive harm to civilians, in clear contravention of the
obligation to respect the principle of distinction as a matter of common
sense and good faith.3' For every death of a suspected Zetian leader, more
than 25 civilians were killed, and many more wounded.3 2 Either the
Predator drones are incapable of distinguishing between military and
civilian targets and are therefore illegal pursuant to Nuclear Weapons, or
the Predator drones are capable of such distinction, and Rigalia willfully
targeted innocent Zetian civilians in violation of IHL.33 In either scenario,
Rigalia has violated international law.
II. THE ATTACK ON THE BAKCHAR VALLEY HOSPITAL IS ATTRIBUTABLE
TO RIGALIA AND WAS AN UNLAWFUL ACT OF AGGRESSION FOR WHICH IT
IS OBLIGATED TO MAKE REPARATIONS.
A. The attack on the Bakchar Valley Hospital is attributable to Rigalia.
1. Rigalia is directly responsible for the Bakchar Valley bombing.
Although Morgania controlled the Drones, Rigalia is directly
responsible for the attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital because: (1)
Rigalian reconnaissance personnel directly participated in the operation;
and (2) Rigalia subsequently adopted the attack. Per the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, relevant portions of which this Court has determined to be
29. Protocol I, supra note 20, at art. 58(3)(b); See also Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, supra note 25, 178-79.
30. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 20, at 78 (French
judgment)(mentioning the prohibition of superfluous harm: "il ne faut pas causer des maux
superflus aux combatants").
31. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1997 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 2199 (Yves
Sandoz et al., eds.) (1987).
32. Comp. 129,30.
33. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 20, at 564 (separate opinion of
Judge Koroma) ("humanitarian law does prohibit the use of certain types of weapons either
because of their indiscriminate effect on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary
and superfluous harm caused to combatants").
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customary international law,34 when actors are organs of a state, conduct of
these actors is directly attributable to that state." Rigalia is directly liable
for the attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital because the informants who
conducted the reconnaissance for the Morganian Drone attack were paid
agents of Rigalia that played an integral part in the operation.36 Rigalian
agents did not merely aid or assist Morgania, but were in effect co-
perpetrators in the internationally wrongful act.
Furthermore, the Predator drone strikes are directly attributable to
Rigalia because the act was "adopted" by Rigalia per Article 11 of the ELC
Draft Articles.38 This court in the Iran Hostages case recognized that
conduct can be attributed to a state upon "endorsement by those authorities
of the situation thus created."39 This endorsement need not be express;
rather, simply failing to condemn an illegal action can attribute that action
to a state.40 Yet, Rigalia went further than mere failure to condemn the
attacks. Rigalia endorsed the egregious attack on the Bakchar Valley
hospital when the Rigalian defense minister proclaimed that the killing of
hundreds of innocent civilians in Ardenia was "a regrettable consequence of
Rigalia's fight to defend itself and its people."'
2. Rigalia is also indirectly responsible for the Bakchar Valley bombing.
Internationally wrongful conduct may be attributed to a state where the
state offers assistance to another state for the commission of an
internationally wrongful act.42 In particular, a state breaches its international
34. Gabelkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 1147-49 (Sept. 25)
[hereinafter Gabdkovo-Nagymaros]; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 138,.1385
(Feb. 26). Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
35. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongfully Acts with commentaries art. 2(2),Y.B.INT'L L.COMM'N (2001) [hereinafter ILC
Draft Articles].
36. Comp. 129.
37. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35, at arts.16(1),19(4).
38. Id. at art. 11.
39. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
3, 9 (May 24) [hereinafter Iran Hostages].
40. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35, at art. 11. See also Iran Hostages, supra note
39,at 74.
41. Comp. 131.
42. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35, at art. 16.
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obligations by permitting the use of its territory by another state to carry out
an armed attack against a third state.43
In 1986, the U.N. called on states "to refrain from extending any
assistance or facilities for perpetrating acts of aggression."" This resolution
admonished the United Kingdom for its joint responsibility in the 1986
bombing of Tripoli, when it allowed several of its air force bases to be used
to launch U.S. planes which carried out attacks on Libyan targets.45
Similarly, Rigalia permitted Morgania to launch strikes against Ardenia
from a base within Rigalia and is therefore at least jointly responsible for
the attacks. 46
Moreover, Rigalia is indirectly liable for the bombing of the Bakchar
Valley hospital because of the operational support it provided Morgania in
carrying out the Predator drone strike.4 7 This Court in Nicaragua found that
a state is liable for the internationally wrongful acts committed by another
party when the former provides aid or assistance to the latter, even if such
acts are not specifically directed by the assisting party.48
B. Rigalia's bombing of the Bakchar Valley hospital was an unlawful use
offorce amounting to aggression.
The U.N. General Assembly's 1974 definition of aggression, and the
International Criminal Court's ("ICC") Assembly of State Parties' adoption
of that definition in 2010, provide a basic framework for determining
whether an act of aggression has been committed.49 U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 3314 establishes in no uncertain terms that "[t]he first use of
armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima
facie evidence of an act of aggression;" this includes "[b]ombardment by
the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use
43. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35, at art. 16(8). See also 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSIANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 663-664 (Aug. 1960); Rosalyn
Higgins, President, Int'l Court of Justice, Speech during the 59th session of the Int'l L.
Comm'n (July 7, 2007), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/9/13919.pdf.




48. Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 1292(3); See also ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35,
art. 16.
49. U.N. Charter art. 2(4); Kampala Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, The Crime of Aggression, annex 2, art. 8, 13th plen. mtg, June 8-11, 2010, U.N.
Doc. RC/Res.6(June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala Definition].
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of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State."o When a
state fails to adhere to the conduct required to assert a right to self-defense,
the state is prohibited from engaging in invasion, attack, bombardment, or
use of any weapon against the territory of another state.51
In assessing whether Rigalia's attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital
constitutes an act of aggression this court should consider that: (1) force
was used against the territory of another state;52 (2) there was a violation of
the jus cogens norm of non-intervention;s35 3 (3) the force was of a sufficient
character, gravity, and scale to constitute an armed attack;5 4 and (4) the act
was not a mistake but was committed with the intent to violate another
state's sovereignty guaranteed by the U.N. Charter and customary
international law. 5 The attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital was a clear
violation of Ardenian sovereignty. Moreover, Rigalia's bombing of the
hospital, which resulted in 350 casualties, is manifestly of sufficient
gravity. Conducting hostilities against a medical facility whether during an
armed conflict or in peace time, is of the gravity that would amount to an
armed attack. Finally, while blowing up the hospital might have been a
mistake, Rigalia does not deny that it acted with the intent to conduct a
military strike within Ardenia's border.
C. Rigalia's bombing of the Bakchar Valley hospital is notjustified by self-
defense.
In order to lawfully use force in another state's territory, a state
invoking self-defense must satisfy three criteria: (1) it must show that it
suffered attacks of sufficient gravity to constitute an armed attack. ;57 (2)
The armed attack must have been perpetrated by a state;58 and (3) the state's
50. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter 1974 Definition]
51. UN Charter art. 2(a)-(b).
52. 1974 Definition, supra note 50, at art. 1.
53. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. See also Declaration on the inadmissibility of
intervention in the domestic affairs of the States and the protection of their independence and
sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR 20th Sess., Supp. No 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014, at 11
(1966).
54. Kampala Definition, supra note 49.
55. U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 1266 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].
56. GC I, supra note 19, at art. 19; GC IV, supra note 22, at art. 18; Protocol I, supra
note 22, at art. 12; Protocol II, supra note 2, at art. 11(1).
57. U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 1195.
58. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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use of self-defense must conform to the customary principles of necessity
and proportionality. 59 Rigalia's use of force does not satisfy these criteria;
thus its claim that it is justified in the bombing of the Bakchar Valley
hospital by self-defense is without merit.
1. Rigalia cannot claim self-defense because its attack on the Bakchar
Valley hospital was not precipitated by an armed attack.
The exercise of the right of self-defense is subject to a state having
been the victim of an armed attack.60 Armed attacks are classified as the
gravest use of force and must be distinguished from other lesser uses of
force.6 1 This Court in Oil Platforms found that a series of minor attacks did
not cumulatively give rise to the justification of self-defense.62 Rigalia
suffered no armed attack which would give rise to the right of self-defense.
2. Even if the court finds that an armed attack occurred against Rigalia,
Rigalia is barred from utilizing the self-defense justification in response to
an attack from a non-state actor.
This Court has rejected the claims of states that have attempted to
justify their use of violence against non-state actors as self- defense. In
Palestinian Wall, this Court held that states are not justified in using self-
defense if they are not attacked by another state.6 Further, in Armed
Activities this Court found that Uganda's claim to self-defense was
unjustified because the attacks which gave rise to the claim did not emanate
from another state, nor were they undertaken on behalf of another state.65
Similarly, in this case, Rigalia used armed force in Ardenia against and in
response to attacks by non-state actors in the absence of evidence that their
acts were controlled or directed by any state.
Rigalia may attempt to argue that the U.N. Security Council resolution
affirming the U.S. use of force in Afghanistan in response to attacks by al-
Qaeda66 has altered this rule.67 This assertion, however, must be rejected, as
59. Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 1 54-55,60; see also Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion, supra note 20, at 1245.
60. Nicaragua, supra note 27, at 195.
61. Id. at 1191.
62. Oil Platfonns (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 64 (Nov. 6).
63. Palestinian Wall, supra note 11, at i1l39-41; See also Nicaragua, supra note 27,
at 195.
64. Palestinian Wall, supra note 1, at 1139-41.
65. Armed Activities, supra note 55, at if 145-46.
66. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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it overlooks the fact that U.N. approval of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
in response to an attack by non-state actors (al-Qaeda) was predicated on
the assumption, based on evidence provided by the United Kingdom, 6 8 that
the Taliban government of Afghanistan was intimately implicated in the
acts of al-Qaeda, as a single jointly-criminal entity.69 Thus, there was not
alteration of international law; rather, the same underlying principles were
applied and still apply: a state may be justified in using self-defense only
when the acts of non-state actors are imputable to a foreign state.70 Rigalia
makes no claim that the terrorist attacks are imputable to Ardenia, nor is
there a sufficient nexus between ZDP activities and Ardenia.
3. Rigalia's failure to immediately notify the Security Council estops
Rigalia from claiming that the attack is justified by self-defense.
Article 51 of the UN Charter requires states resorting to the use of
force in self-defense to immediately report to the Security Council." The
Charter's notice requirement serves the purpose of informing the Security
Council of the specific justifications for the use of force, thus enabling the
council to gauge whether the military action was necessary and
proportional.7 2 This Court held in Armed Activities that, because Uganda
failed to immediately notify the Security Council of its military actions in
the Congo, Uganda was prohibited from relying on the doctrine of self-
defense to justify its use of force. Similarly, Rigalia's failure to provide
the required immediate notice to the Security Council disqualifies it from
relying on self-defense as justification for its armed attack.
D. Rigalia is obligated to make reparations to Ardenia for the bombing of
the Bakchar Valley hospital.
States that commit an internationally wrongful act are obligated to
make full reparation for the injury caused by the act.74 Because the Predator
67. Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the 'Grotian Moment', 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439
(2010).
68. Elena Katselli & Sangeeta Shah, September 11 and the UK Response, 52 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 245-255 (2003).
69. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (Nov. 14, 2001).
70. Palestinian Wall, supra note 1, at 16,139.
71. U.N. Charter art. 51.
72. Id.
73. Armed Activities, supra note 55, at 145.
74. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 35, at art. 31. See generally Factory at Chorzbw
(Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 44 (May 25).
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drone strikes are attributable to Rigalia and the harm suffered was a product
of an internationally wrongful act, Rigalia must make reparations to
account for all of the consequences of the illegal act, both material and
moral. As was the case in Armed Activities, Rigalia is bound to make
reparations for the harm it caused through the perpetration of an
internationally wrongful act.76 Ardenia need not provide a precise monetary
sum at this time; rather, the Court can appoint a special expert to determine
the monetary award or require the parties to negotiate the award in good
faith.7
III. RIGALIA'S MAVAZI BAN VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF ZETIAN WOMEN
AND GIRLS.
The Rigalian law banning Zetian women from wearing the Mavazi, a
sacred religious headcovering, contravenes articles 2, 18 and 19 of the
ICCPR which sets forth the rights to freedom of religious belief7 8 and
expression. 9 External manifestations of religion, such as wearing
headcoverings for religious purposes, have also been granted protection
under the authoritative interpretations of the International Human Rights
Committee and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.80 In
its general commentary on the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee
stressed that where religious symbols place emphasis on female modesty
and humility as the Mavazi does, these symbols are protected by the
international human rights principles contained in the ICCPR.
75. Factory at Chorzbw (Ger. v. Pol.), Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (July
26); Factory at Chorztdw (Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J (ser. A) No. 13 (Dec. 16). See
also Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 1110 (1990).
76. Armed Activities, supra note 55, at 259; Gabdikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 34, at
1152. See also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. , 119 (Mar.
31).
77. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 50, June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179;
see Armed Activities, supra note 55, at 1261; Gabeikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 34, at 183.
78. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 18.
79. Id. at art. 19.
80. Id.; Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98, 2001-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 462, 183
(Feb. 15). See also Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC]; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 933
U.N.T.S. 3, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)[hereinafter
ICESCRI.
81. Human Rights Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comment 22: Art. 18(4),
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1. (1994)[hereinafter General Comment 221 reprinted
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In Dahlab v. Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights
examined a narrow restriction on public school teachers wearing a Muslim
headscarf. There, the Court articulated that such principles of freedom of
thought, expression and religion were foundational to a democratic society
and that the protection of those rights was at the core of the Convention's
aims.82 In another case, Belgium's Hasselt Civil Court overturned a ban on
the patka, a head covering of the Sikh faith, stating that such a ban was
incompatible with ideals of religious tolerance and freedom.83 With respect
to the one country (France), whose recently expanded ban on Muslim head
coverings is as broad as Rigalia's Mavazi ban, experts have opined that it is
unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge or European Court scrutiny.84
The Rigalian Mavazi ban also violates Articles 14 and 15 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"), which grant children the
same rights as adults in terms of practicing their religions, adhering to their
faiths and embracing their cultures.s In accordance with Zetian cultural and
religious traditions, at the age of 14, a Zetian girl is supposed to have the
ability to don the Mavazi and become a woman in the eyes of her people.86
Under Rigalia's ban, this traditional rite of passage has been barred,
impacting both the religious and social expression rights of Zetian
children.
Under the ICCPR and the CRC, limitations on an individual's
religious expression are only permissible if they meet the following test: (1)
the limitation must be prescribed by law;88 (2) it must have a legitimate aim
and narrow purpose; 89 and (3) the restriction must be necessary to protect
in SARAH JOSEPH ET. AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 502 (2d ed. 2004).
82. General Comment 22, supra note 81.
83. Belgian Court Overturns Ban on Sikh Headcoverings in School, SikhNet, July 2,
2008, available at http://www.sikhnet.com/daily-news/belgian-court-overturns-ban-on-sikh-
headcovering-in-school.
84. Questions and Answers on Restrictions on Religious Dress and Symbols in Europe,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 21, 2010, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/12/20/ questions-and-answers-restrictions-religious-dress-
and-symbols-europe.
85. CRC, supra note 81, at arts. 13,14.
86. Comp. 13.
87. Id.
88. R (on the application of SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School, [2005] EWCA
Civ 199; Dogru v. France, App. No. 27058/05, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2008); Sahin v. Turkey,
App. No. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. H.R. Rep. 173 (Nov. 10); Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No.
16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 93 (1993).
89. Dogru v. France, supra note 88.
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public safety, order, health, morals, or the rights of others.90 While the ban
has been codified by the Rigalian legislature,9' neither of the latter two
elements has been met.
A. The ban lacks legitimate aim and narrow purpose.
Rigalia passed the ban as a piece of reactionary legislation, rather than
a legitimate attempt at mitigating public disorder. The ban was adopted
immediately following President Khutai's declaration of war with the
Zetian secessionist movement, by a vote of 275-25; only ethnic Zetians
were in the dissenting minority.92 This context suggests a piece of
legislation lacking a legitimate aim.
Rigalia may attempt to argue that this ban has a narrow purpose.
However, where bans on head coverings have been upheld, the bans were
much more narrowly tailored than the broad Rigalian ban. In Karaduman
v. Turkey, for example, a young woman was asked to remove a headscarf
for purposes of taking a university identification photograph.94 She was not
prohibited from wearing the headscarf generally. There, the European Court
of Human Rights focused its decision on the voluntary nature of her
attendance at that particular university." Rigalia's ban, in contrast, is broad
and general; it bars women from wearing the Mavazi in public without
exception. As the European Court explained in Dogru v. France, such a
broad ban goes too far. There the court stated that France had the burden to
show that its ban on Muslim headscarves from public schools was
appropriately limited, justified and tied closely to the purposes for which it
was intended.9 7 The European Court reiterated its commitment to
secularism, but focused on the narrow scope of the ban in question. Here,
90. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 18(3).
91. Comp. 121.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Education for the School District of
Philadelphia (where the secular appearance of state-funded schools was at issue),
Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (18 January 2005) (where
the Human Rights Committee found a violation of Article 18(2) regarding a broad ban of
Islamic headscarves).
94. Karaduman v. Turkey, supra note 88.
95. R (on the application of SB) v Governors of Denbigh High School, supra note 88
(held that a school, as an extension of the state, would have to show reasons to prohibit
religious dress); Sahin v. Turkey, supra note 88 (held that the need for prohibiting the wearing
of the headscarf in a university setting was specific enough to justify the law).
96. Comp. 16.
97. Dogru v. France, supra note 88.
254 [Vol. I8:1
Distinguished Brief
Rigalia has articulated neither a legitimate aim for its ban, nor has it shown
that the ban is limited and tailored to a particular goal that falls within the
narrow exception of the ICCPR.
B. Rigalia cannot rely on the margin ofappreciation doctrine.
Rigalia may attempt to assert that this Court should adopt a deferential
approach to its legislation under the margin of appreciation doctrine, which
has only been applied by the European Court of Human Rights.98 While the
European Convention has been used as a model for interpreting the ICCPR,
the margin of appreciation has not been used outside of the European
context.99 Even if this Court were to entertain applying this doctrine for the
first time, such an application would not go so far as legitimizing the
Mavazi ban. The European Court of Human Rights recognized the limits to
the margin of appreciation doctrine, stressing that a state, in striking a
balance between the collectively-oriented needs of the state and the needs
of the individual, could not disregard human rights concerns. fo
C. Rigalia cannot rely on the public safety and order exception to Article
18 of the ICCPR.
While Rigalia has experienced unrest in the Zetian provinces and finds
it necessary to respond to the secessionist threats from the Zetian
Democratic Party, this does not justify violating international human rights
conventions.' 0 The basic human rights of the Zetian women cannot be
usurped due to an alleged national necessity.102 The ICCPR expressly
permits some narrow exceptions to the freedom of religious belief, but only
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or to ensure the protection
of others' rights and freedoms. 10 3 National security must not be confused
with ensuring public order, especially in times of declared emergency.10 In
98. George Letsas, Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, 26 OXFORD
J. L. STUDIES 705 (2006); Michael R. Hutchinson, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the
European Court of Human Rights, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 638-50 (1999).
99. Letsas, supra note 98, at 705.
100. Sahin v. Turkey, supra note 88.
101. Comp. 16.
102. General Comment 22, supra note 81, at f1 ("The fundamental character of these
freedoms is also reflected in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time
of public emergency, as stated in article 4.2 of the Covenant.")
103. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 18(3).
104. Susan Rose-Ackerman & Benjamin Billa, Treaties and National Security, 40
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 437 (2008).
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interpreting these limitations, the Human Rights Committee declared in
General Comment 22 that "[p]aragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly
interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds . . . such as national
security." os Therefore, Rigalia cannot justify its illegal Mavazi ban on
national security grounds.
Further, Rigalia cannot meet the requirements of the narrow Article 18
exception for the "protect[ion of] public safety."' 06 In order for a state party
to meet this exception by passing legislation that restricts the external
manifestation of a religious belief, the party must show that such a
restriction meets the threshold established in General Comment 22.107
While Rigalia attempts to assert that it carried out the Mavazi ban for
purposes of public order and safety in a time of emergency, it can point to
only a single instance of an extremist using the Mavazi to conceal his
identity while carrying out an act of terrorism, and has never specified the
number of casualties, if any, from this incident.'0 8 This was a solitary event,
and cannot justify a broad and sweeping ban of the religious garment. In
order for this Court to legitimize the ban, Rigalia bears the burden to show
that there is a "sufficient justification" for the law, or that there is an
"objective and reasonable justification" for the ban.'09 Here, there is no
evidence that the ban has decreased terrorist activity in the region, nor that
it actively protects any fundamental rights of Rigalians."o Furthermore, the
affirmative defense of necessity as a justification for breaching human
rights has been overruled time and time again, as human rights law
continues to apply even in states of emergency."
105. Human Rights Comm., Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General Comment 18: Art. 22,
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/l/Rev.1. (1994) in JOSEPH, supra note 81.
106. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 18(3); General Comment 22, supra note 81, at 11.
107. General Comment 22, supra note 82.
108. Comp. 116.
109. Mauritian Women's Case, HRC Resn. 9.35, UN Doc. A/36/40, at 134, 36 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 40)(1981); Belgian Linguistics, (1979-1980) 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) at
252 (1968).
110. Comp. 128.
Ill. Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court, Israeli General Security Service, GSS's




D. Rigalia's Mavazi ban is discriminatory.
1. The Mavazi ban violates the rule that any legislative restriction of
expression must be crafted in the interest of creating equality in fact.
Under Article 2 of the ICCPR, states party to the Covenant shall not
infringe on the rights of an individual to practice his or her religion, partake
in his or her culture, or discriminate against an individual based on his or
her religion, sex or social status.!12 While the Mavazi ban appears neutral
on its face, its effect is discriminatory as it is felt only by Zetian women
practicing Masinto, who wear the Mavazi as an external manifestation of
their internal devotion to their religion, their tribe, and their culture."l3
The Rigalian government did not ban any other forms of religious
attire at the time that it banned the Mavazi or at any point thereafter;
elimination of the Mavazi from public life was the sole purpose of the
legislation, as President Khutai stated publicly.114 Consequently, the only
ill-affected members of society were Zetian-Masinto women. If the goal
was actually to enhance public order and safety, the Rigalian legislature
would have banned other garments that have been used in the course of
terrorist attacks, such as burqas,"' niqabs,"6 or even ski masks.
2. Rigalia may not rely on CEDAW to justify its discriminatory legislation.
The Court should not accept Rigalia's claim that the Mavazi ban
furthers the purposes of CEDAW. According to Articles 26 and 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, all international obligations
must be interpreted in good faith and in the context in which they were
112. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art 2(1).
113. Comp. 13; see generally W. MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983)(describing the distinction between belief in the forum internum
and manifestations in the forum externum.).
114. Comp. 21.
115. Zeeshan Haider, Pakistan Suicide Bomber was woman covered in Burqa,
REUTERS.COM, Dec. 26, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.comlarticle/idUSTRE6BPlOP20101226.
116. Daniel Pipes, Lion's Den: Niqabs and Burqas:The Veiled Threat Continues,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=153585.
117. Thomas Sheehan, Italy: Behind the Ski Mask, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 16, 1979,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1979/aug/16/italy-behind-the-ski-
mask/(ski masks were used to disguise identity by groups such as the Italian Red Brigades
terrorist organization, in the 1970's).
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intended and with their specific goals and purposes in mind."'8 International
obligations must be interpreted in light of all other applicable international
treaty obligations as well."'9 The objectives of CEDAW are to equalize
standards for men and women, not to force women to conform to secular
dress codes.120 If Rigalia's interpretation of the Convention is upheld,
CEDAW would be turned on its head to remove the decision-making
abilities of women, at a time when human rights courts around the world
are upholding a woman's right to wear symbols of her faith.12 ' Although
women may be subjected to tribal penalties in the Northern Provinces for
not wearing the Mavazi, the choice to express their religious beliefs must be
protected by Rigalia.12 2 It is not the role of the state to prescribe permissible
religious expression.123
Moreover, in contrast to Rigalia's professed objective, the elimination
of the Mavazi from public life further burdens Zetian women.
Anthropologists have examined this issue as it applies to Muslim women
and have found that the wearing of religious garments is a reassurance to
the wearer that she is demonstrating the norms and values of her culture, as
well as actively participating in it.'24 Similarly, sociological studies have
confirmed that the linkage between religious attire and the connection a
woman feels to her culture confers a sense of liberation rather than
oppression. 12 5 The wearing of a head covering for a devout woman should
not be confused with a lack of legal agency.12 6 The adherence to her
religion and tradition, as well as the expression thereof, is a guaranteed
human right that should not be removed by Rigalian legislators presuming
to act on her behalf.12 7
118. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26,31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (1969)[hereinafter VCLTI.
119. Id.
120. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
121. Sahin v. Turkey, supra note 88; Karaduman v. Turkey, supra note 88; Dogru v.
France, supra note 88; Dahlab v. Swizerland, supra note 80.
122. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 933 U.N.T.S. 3,
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)[hereinafter ICESCR].
123. Id at art. 1, 13.
124. Id.
125. Muhammad Khalid Masud , Dress Matters: Change and Continuity in the Dress
Practices of Bosnian Muslim Refugee Women, 19(1) GENDER & SOCIETY 44, 45 (2005).
126. Id.
127. ICCPR, supra note 15, at art. 2(1)-(2).
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IV. ARDENIA DID NOT VIOLATE THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
OR THE OECD DECISION ON MNE GUIDELINES.
As an preliminary matter, Ardenia notes that Rigalia has the burden of
proof on all aspects of this counter-claim. 128
A. Rigalia cannot demonstrate the undue influence on a foreign public
official in the bidding process, which is necessary for violations of the
OECD Convention.
1. There is no undue advantage or injury shown in the bidding process for
the Moria Mine contract renewal.
In order for a violation to fall within the scope of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, it must amount to gaining an "undue pecuniary or
other advantage" in a bidding process.12 9 The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises are concerned with acts of bribery in terms of
how these acts create unfairness and undue advantage in global markets. 130
Here, the prerequisite for applying the Convention and the Guidelines is
absent, as Rigalia has failed to demonstrate that the renewal of the Contract
constituted an undue advantage or injury. Rigalia, itself, suffered no direct
injury in this bidding process, and thus lacks standing to bring this claim
under the OECD Convention. Further, no aggrieved Rigalian party has
come forward alleging financial injury, so there is no national for whom
Rigalia may espouse a claim. Therefore, there is no injury for Rigalia to
assert before this Court.
2. The alleged targets of the bribe are not foreign public officials within the
meaning of the Convention.
Both the Convention and Guidelines apply only to the bribing of
"foreign" public officials, and do not address purely domestic acts of
128. Oil Platforms, supra note 62, at 214; see also Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949
I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6).
129. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development(OECD), Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, art. 1 1,
Nov. 21, 1997 available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdflhereinafter Anti-
Bribery Convention].
130. Comm. on Int'l Investment and Multinat'l Enterprises, OECD, The OECD
Declaration and Decision on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basic
Texts, annex 1, OECD Doc. DAFFE/IME(2000)20, Nov. 9, 2000 [hereinafter MNE
Guidelines].
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bribery."' In the present case, all of the alleged acts occurred within
Ardenia: MDI allegedly paid the bribe to the Zetian Refugees Fund
("ZRF"), an Ardenian charity, in the name of Clyde Zangara, who lives in
Ardenian territory. 132 While Rigalia alleges that Leo Bikra was the ultimate
target of these bribes, the standard of active bribery means that only the
alleged affirmative actions of MDI may be evaluated. 33
Furthermore, the Guidelines and Convention only apply to the bribery
of foreign "public officials." The ZRF is a private charity, not a government
entity. 134 Clyde Zangara, in turn, is an agent of a non-governmental
organization and not a public official.'35 Any money donated to the fund, or
to Clyde Zangara, therefore, does not constitute a payment to a public
official. While Rigalia claims that the target of the bribe was Leo Bikra,
RRI's Director General, the MNE Guidelines may be triggered only when a
public official exercises "sovereign authority." 136 In the present case, there
is no evidence that Leo Bikra exercises any such authority; he is merely a
state-appointed head of a business entity. 3 7 Consequently, neither the
OECD Convention nor the MNE Guidelines are applicable in this case.
3. Ardenia justifiably denied the request for mutual legal assistance
because it was too broad.
Requests for mutual legal assistance ("MLA") must be "for the
purpose of criminal investigation in proceedings brought by a party
concerning offenses within the scope of the Convention." 38 Since MDI's
alleged actions do not fall within the scope of the Convention, the MLA
request was invalid. Assuming, arguendo, that the Court feels that the
allegations do fall within the scope of the Convention, the documents
requested would still not be accessible, as the request is too broad. Ardenia
may provide access only to MDI's bank records under the OECD
Convention, as the scope of the investigation is MDI's conduct in allegedly
bribing RRI;' 39 Rigalia's request for correspondence between ZRF and
131. Id.
132. Comp. 11.
133. THE OECD CONVENTION ON BRIBERY: A COMMENTARY 96 (Mark Pieth et al.,
eds., 2007)[hereinafter PIETH COMMENTARY]at 247.
134. Comp. 111.
135. PIETH COMMENTARY, supra note 133, at 70.
136. Id.
137. Comp. 11.




members of the tribal councils goes beyond that scope. Further, Ardenia
law bars access to these documents. 14 0 While Article 9(3) does not permit
noncompliance on the basis of bank secrecy, nothing in the record suggests
that is the motivation for the Ardenian law.141 Finally, Ardenia has not
denied the request, but instead has responded as best it can, putting Rigalia
on notice of the issues with its domestic law, and explaining that it is
attempting to comply in good faith with its international obligations.142
Therefore, Ardenia's response was not in fact a breach of the OECD
Convention.14 3
B. Ardenia's investigation was stopped for permissible reasons of national
security.
Article 5 of the OECD Convention grants broad prosecutorial
discretion to domestic jurisdictions, limiting that discretion only in
instances of national economic interest, foreign relations impacts, and
where the identity of the parties influence the decision. Relying on
standards of treaty interpretation,'" this means that it is permissible for a
country to halt investigations into bribery allegations for purposes of
national security.145
1. The Prosecutor's public statement regarding "national security
concerns" holds greater validity than statements about national economic
interest made in media reports.
In June of 2009 Prosecutor Strong announced that the Ardenian
investigation into the bribery allegations was terminated due to national
security concerns.14 6 Under this Court's jurisprudence in the Iran Hostages
case, highly placed government officials, such as Prosecutor Strong, may
give the "seal of government approval" in their public statements.'4 7 While





144. VCLT, supra note 118, at art. 31.
145. Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 129, at art. 5. See R (on the application of
Corner House Research and others) v. Director of the Serious Frauds Office, [2008] U.K.H.L.
60 (H.L) (appeal taken from Admin.); Rose-Ackerman & Billa, supra note 104.
146. Comp. 125.
147. Iran Hostages, supra note 39, at 73; see also Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 473, 474-5 (Dec. 20).
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subordinated to President Arwen's suggestion that national economic
interest may also have played a role in the decision not to prosecute,148 such
an interpretation would be improper. President Arwen's comment to the
news outlet was not an official public statement on the investigation and
should not be read as such.
2. In state practice, national economic interests necessarily play a role in
decisions to pursue investigations into bribery allegations.
Even if the Court were to focus on President Arwen's suggestion that
national economic interests played a role in the decision not to prosecute
MDI, this should not amount to a violation of Article 5 of the OECD
Convention.149 "National economic interest" should be interpreted in light
of state practice. 50 Thirty-two other state parties have either implemented
domestic statutory exceptions to Article 5 of the OECD Convention, or
consistently fail to prosecute claims where national economic interests
would be injured.'5 ' In light of state practice in Ardenia's favor, and the
lack of international case law on the topic,152 the Court should not enforce
the prohibition of relying on "national economic interest" against Ardenia.
C. Facilitation payments are acceptable under OECD standards, and
under agreed upon exceptions in state practice.
While the OECD Convention bars bribery of foreign public officials, it
left an exception for facilitation payments.153 These payments are those
which induce lawful actions by public officials and do not rely on a
discretionary decision of the official. MDI's conduct as it pertains to "small
facilitation payments" is not in conflict with the OECD Convention.154
Consistent with Comment 9, an authoritative interpretation of the OECD
Convention, Ardenia has created an exception, within its legislation
148. Comp. 125.
149. Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 131, at art. 5.
150. VCLT, supra note 118, at art. 31.
151. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, FOREIGN BRIBERY AND OECD COUNTRIES: A HOLLOW
COMMITMENT? PROGRESS REPORT 2009, available at
http://www.transparency.org/news-room/in-focus /2009/oecdpr_2009 [hereinafter TI
REPORT].
152. Id.
153. Id.(noting that only four states actively prosecute); Anti-Bribery Convention supra
note 131, at art. 1; PIETH COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at xxx (reprinting the OECD
Commentary on the Anti-Bribery Convention, 19).
154. PIETH COMMENTARY, supra note 153, at xxx.
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regarding bribery offenses, for "small facilitation payments."' 5 ' There is no
violation of Ardenia's OECD obligations in this area, as the payments are
designed only to allow passage for coltan reserves from the Moria Mine to
Rigaliaville, and requires no discretion from the tribal councils.
Rigalia cannot claim that Ardenia's facilitation payments are
incongruous with customary international law. While some states have
narrowed exceptions for facilitation payments and the OECD frowns upon
the use of these payments, exception still exists in the OECD Convention
and the large majority of states in the world continue to permit facilitation
payments.'56
155. Comp. 138.
156. TI REPORT, supra note 151.
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V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
For the reasons stated above, Ardenia respectfully requests that this
Court:
1. DECLARE that Rigalia's Predator drone strikes are illegal under
international law, ORDER their immediate cessation, and ORDER that
Rigalia make reparations for the harm the attacks caused;
2. DECLARE that Rigalia's attack on the Bakchar Valley hospital was
an unlawful use of force rising to the level of aggression and ORDER
Rigalia to make reparations for the harm caused thereby;
3. DECLARE that Rigalia's ban of the Mavazi constitutes a violation of
international human rights law; and
4. DECLARE that Ardenia's discontinuation of its investigation into the
payments over the Moria Mine, its refusal to provide Rigalia the
requested bank records, and its small facilitation payments did not
constitute a violation of its OECD obligations.
Respectfully submitted,
Agent for Applicant
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